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The Political Consequences of Crisis: Lessons learned from the Great 
Recession  
By Swen Hutter, Endre Borbáth, Sophia Hunger 
When the Great Recession hit Europe in 2008, commentators turned to the Great 
Depression of the 1930s in order to understand the political consequences of economic 
hardship. In the same vein, we now turn to the most recent economic crisis to draw three 
lessons about how it affected political conflict and party systems in Europe and to receive 
clues for what to expect from the political fallout of the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. 
We draw on insights gained from the ERC Project Political Conflict in the Great Recession 
in which we were involved from 2014 to 2019 (e.g., Conti et al. 2018; Hutter & Kriesi 2019; 
Kriesi et al. 2020). 
Lesson 1: Economic hardship may reinforce cultural, not economic, divides 
All economies contracted in the first wave of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. Given 
the bleak economic picture, observers expected a return of classic left-right conflicts over 
social welfare and economic liberalism (e.g., Bermeo and Bartels 2014). However, looking 
back at the decade, we see that our empirical results paint a different picture. The trend 
in Europe’s party systems points to even stronger conflicts over so-called cultural or 
political issues. Immigration, European integration, and the way democracy works (or 
fails) have been increasingly contested in the aftermath of the Great Recession. The most 
polarizing objects of contestation have varied across Europe for two main reasons. On the 
one hand, some countries were not as affected as others by the economic crisis after the 
first shock period. On the other hand, the political consequences of the crisis reinforced 
long-term trends that had been underway long before the Great Recession. However, the 
key message is that the financial and economic shape of the immediate crisis by no 
means determined the shape of conflicts that followed in its wake.  
Lesson 2: It takes time! The hour of the radicals is yet to come 
In line with the expectation that economic conflicts would come back, observers also 
speculated about the return of a strong electoral competition between left and right 
mainstream parties and about the direction in which the pendulum might swing (e.g., 
Lindvall 2014). It turned out that citizens’ responses to the Great Recession strongly 
diverged in the short and long term. At the first stage, the pendulum swung a little to the 
right, although the key factor was who held government responsibility when the crisis 
hit. However, the electoral fortunes of all mainstream parties worsened at the next stage. 
This is because the short-term logic of (dis-)trusting the government differs from the 
long-term logic of benchmarking the incumbent’s performance against that of other 
governments in the region. When recovery was sluggish and Troika intervention was 
needed, voters first punished their government by voting for mainstream opposition 
parties. Only when their patience ran out with “all” mainstream parties did they turn 
towards radical parties, both left and right, again depending on the macro-region. Thus, 
the hour of radical parties came in the second or third crisis election when the voters’ 
anger had peaked. The fortunes of the Greek parties are telling in this respect. 
Disappointed in the social-democratic PASOK government, Greek voters at first voted for 
the center-right New Democracy, and only voted the left-wing challenger, Syriza, into 
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office in the fourth crisis election in January 2015. While such sequences are far from 
automatic, they show that political responses to a crisis follow their own endogenous 
non-linear dynamic. 
Lesson 3: Watch the streets! Movement politics as a source of renewal 
Street protests made a broad impact on the political sphere in the Great Recession by 
drawing attention to new issues and providing a stepping stone for new actors, some of 
whom quickly gained institutional power (della Porta et al. 2017). The movement politics 
in the Great Recession have often been underestimated as the crisis did not spark one 
universal European wave of street protest, but rather waves with strong regional and 
national differences. However, what all their actors shared was that they experimented 
with new forms of protest. Most notable are the Occupy Wallstreet movement and the 
Indignados in Southern Europe for their reliance on protest camps, assemblies in central 
squares, and political strikes. These events became strong symbols of the grievances 
which the crisis had provoked and sparked global attention to economic and political 
claims. Slogans such as “We are the 99%” or demands for a basic universal income and 
financial transaction taxes reverberated around the world as did the calls for a complete 
renewal of democratic processes. Interestingly, these movements institutionalized and 
entered parliament at a speed rarely seen before. The most illustrative examples are the 
radical left challenger Podemos in Spain and the ideologically hybrid Movimento 5 Stelle 
in Italy. However, also the radical right in Germany and in other Northwestern European 
countries profited from street-level protest dynamics. These actors critically shaped the 
political consequences of the Great Recession but profited from an electoral logic which 
had been inconceivable when the protesters started to take it to the streets in 2010.  
The Corona crisis differs from the Great Recession in many obvious respects, and it is too 
early to gauge the extent and form of the crises Europe will face in its wake. However, 
what should stand out from the lessons learned after the Great Recession is the need to 
remain careful when inferring the long-term political consequences of a crisis from its 
first shock period. Premature predictions about a return of traditional economic conflicts, 
about renewed electoral competition between the mainstream left and right as well as 
about a fundamental political renewal from below did not age well. The many more 
known unknowns in the current situation should make us even more cautious. 
--- 
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